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Abstract
Purpose: The purpose of  this article is to develop an analytical model to assess airline expansion strategies by combining
generic business strategy models with airline business models.
Design/methodology: A number of  airline business models are examined, as are Porter’s (1983) industry five forces that
drive competition, complemented by Nalebuff  and Brandenburger’s (1996) sixth force, and the basic elements of  the
general environment in which the expansion process takes place.  A system of  points and weights is developed to create a
score among the 904,736 possible combinations considered. The model’s outputs are generic expansion strategies with
quantitative assessments for each specific combination of  elements inputted.
Originality/value: The analytical model developed is original because it combines for the first time and explicitly elements
of  the general environment, industry environment, airline business models and the generic expansion strategy types. Besides
it creates a system of  scores that may be used to drive the decision process toward the choice of  a specific strategic
expansion path.
Research implications: The analytical model may be adapted to other industries apart from the airline industry by
substituting the element “airline business model” by other industries corresponding elements related to the different specific
business models.
Keywords: airline expansion strategies, analytical model, airline business models, industry forces, general environment,
generic expansion strategies.
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1. Introduction
The expansion strategy adopted by a specific airline is most influenced by three groups of
elements. First, the business model chosen by the organization to better exploit opportunities,
considering its competencies and limitations. Second, the industry environment where the
business dynamics take place, including competition, suppliers, buyers, potential new entrants,
substitute transportation services, and complementors (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997).
Third, the general environment, where the airline is located, involving economic, geographic,
demographic, legal and political aspects, which delineates the scenario where the organization
aims to survive. 
This paper follows the theoretical assumptions of the industrial organization school (or IO, for
short), which recommends that the identification of external opportunities should come in first
place and the promotion of a firm’s adjustment to better exploit the opportunities identified
should come in a second stage. According to this school, all resources and competencies can
be bought in the market if they don’t exist in the firm (Porter, 2008; Ghemawat, 2002). Thus,
core competencies, for instance, will be assumed as being implicit in each airline business
model.
This paper discusses these aspects developing a conceptual framework at the end. 
2. Airline business models
Airline business models can be classified using two basic dimensions: sophistication and
fulfilment of services and the stage length of flights, as shown in Figure 1 below, which shows
Boeing’s view of current airline business models. The first dimension is related with the
consumer target whilst the second is related with the operational platform used by the airline.
Figure 3.1 below 
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Figure 1. Airlines Business Models (Source: Boeing Company, Airline Strategy and Business Models,
unpublished, 2007 Airline Planning Seminar’s supporting media)
The dimensions represented in figure 1 – flight stage length and level of services supplied-
reflect the main characteristics of a specific air service, i.e. the most important operating
features, which are associated to the type of equipment to be used, and the level of comfort
intended to be supplied. In other words, the main operating and marketing aspects are
considered in abscissa axis and ordinate axis, respectively. Another important feature of
Boeing’s classification is its scope, which encompasses many different -if not all – types of
airlines.
Boeing’s taxonomy (2007) is not precise about the meaning of short, medium and long haul
flights. However, for the purpose of this paper, short haul flights are understood as being those
of less than 3 hours duration; long haul flights are assumed as those of more than 6 hours of
duration, while medium haul flights are those between 3 and 6 hours duration.
Boeing’s classification is also not precise about the services offered by the different kinds of
airlines. So, it is also assumed in this paper that low cost airlines are those carriers that offer a
simplified service focusing their marketing efforts almost exclusively on reduced prices. Full-
service airlines are understood here as being those carriers that offer a broad scope of
services, including dual or more cabin classes, large networks, cargo services, etc. and, as
consequence, their marketing efforts are not exclusively concentrated on prices. Mixed offering
airlines are assumed as being those airlines whose service offers are in an intermediate
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position between full service and low cost airlines.
Obviously, airlines have different core competencies that lead their competitive movements,
including expansion strategies. For instance, Ryanair’s core competency is its capability of
supplying basic services at a very low cost, but staff friendliness to passengers probably is not.
British Airways’ core competency is related to creating brand loyalty by offering superior
services, but low costs are not its main concern. Southwest’s core competency is its human
resources’ motivation, which is managed in order to provide to clients a friendly service.
American Airlines core competencies are its network and its frequent flyer program,
Advantage, but staff courtesy is clearly a competitive weakness.
In short, each airline has competencies and limitations on which their strategies lay. Combining
these elements with the business model chosen makes it possible to delineate the strategic
scope that an airline can consistently adopt. According to Boeing’s classification, the airlines
business models are the following:
• “Broad Network” airlines are medium to large sized carriers and offer services of
intermediate sophistication. They concentrate on medium to long haul operations.
• “Global” airlines are a business model applicable to large and complex airlines,
operating in several continents as well as domestic markets.
• “Short Haul / Medium Haul Independents” are airlines that offer a mid-sophisticated
service mix and concentrate their efforts on markets with a flight time not longer than
3.5 hours.
• “Long haul Independents” have the same features as “Short Haul/Medium Haul
Independents”. However, on long haul flights amenities offered play a more important
role to passengers than in short or medium haul flights.
• “All Premium / Business” airlines explore the very wealthy passengers’ niche. They
charge relatively high fares, but their rates are often lower than the business-class or
first-class fares charged by global airlines.
• “Regionals” are airlines that operate short distance flights. Most of the time, their main
competition are the other means of transportation, such as trains, buses or individual
vehicles.
• “Charter / Inclusive Tour” airlines offer non-scheduled services, which often involve
tourist packages at very low prices. In general these airlines fly from big cities to tourist
destinations offering simplified services in high density configuration aircraft.
• “Low Fare” airlines are also called “Low Cost Carriers”, or LCCs. These airlines emerged
in the United States in the late 1970s following the Air Deregulation Act of 1978. In
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Europe the same happened fifteen years later when the liberalization process took
place. Because indirect costs and operating expenses tend to represent smaller
proportions of total costs as flight stage length increases, LCC’s cost advantage over
legacy carriers tend to reduce on longer flights (Moreira, O’Connell & Williams, 2011).
3. Industry environment in the airline business
The industry environment refers to the airline’s external environment that influences most
directly its operations. As defined by Burgeois III (1980), industry environment corresponds to
the task environment. As a consequence, industry environment should be understood as being
influenced by a firm’s secondary strategies, as defined by the author.
Although the Five Forces of Competition Model formulated by Porter (1983) is not new it has
been one of the most popular analytical frameworks for evaluating any industry’s environment.
However, as the airline industry is particularly affected by governmental rules and policies, the
use of Nalebuff and Brandenburguer’s (1997) sixth force concept in addition to Porter’s (1983)
model appears to be more robust at analyzing this industry.
In spite of the importance of these contributions the literature is very poor with relation to the
application of Porter’s Five Forces model and that of Nalebuff and Brandenburguer’s Value Net
model to the airline industry.
3.1 Suppliers’ bargaining power
The main suppliers in the air transport industry are aircraft and spare parts manufacturers,
banks with specific financing lines, aircraft lessors, fuel suppliers, distribution systems (in
particular the Global Distribution Systems–GDS), airports and aeronautical infrastructure
providers.
Aircraft manufacturers are very concentrated with few examples where there are more than
two alternatives for the same class of aircraft. The huge investment required, the inherent
gains of scale in production processes and the extensive technology existing in this industry
probably are the main factors contributing to its high concentration. As a consequence, aircraft
manufacturers’ bargaining power is considerably high, their technological developments being
one of the main drivers of the airline industry.
Lessors are intermediates between manufacturers and operators, buying airplanes and renting
them to airlines. The lessors’ sector is a less concentrated sector than that of the
manufacturers’ and has a proportionally smaller bargaining power. Differently from the
manufacturers’ sector, among lessors the technology applied is not high and gains of scale and
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capital requirements are not so intense. As a consequence, barriers to entry in this sector are
not high and players are numerous. 
In general, fuel suppliers have a small bargaining power because they are numerous and their
product is a commodity. However, in some countries governments create artificially high
barriers to entry in order to protect their state owned oil companies. When that is the case,
fuel suppliers’ bargaining power increases significantly.
Airports are the strongest players in the air transport production chain because there are high
entry barriers, which are even higher in cities or regions served by only one airport. As a
consequence, their financial margins are significantly higher than those of the airlines (Pagliari,
2008).
Global Distribution Systems – GDS are worldwide systems that connect airlines reservation
systems to travel agents terminals. Because a great proportion of sales are made through
travel agents, GDSs correspond to sales channels which represent 70 to 80% of tickets sold.
The four more important existing GDS are: Sabre, Amadeus, Galileo and Worldspan. By having
enormous bargaining power, GDS’s charge US$2.00 to US$6.00 per booking, depending on the
connectivity, contract territorial range, etc. irrespective of the booking effectiveness.
The Internet has been a great threat to GDSs. This is the reason why the GDSs are changing
their strategy, repositioning themselves as “engine providers” to online travel agents
(Worldspan and Expedia, for instance), or acquiring online travel agents (Galileo and
Amadeus). Their purpose is to reduce booking fees charged.
On the other hand, because the airline industry’s suppliers -such as reservation systems
providers, catering and handling providers and other airport services suppliers- are smaller
sized and, in general, more profitable than the airlines, they don’t represent to airlines a threat
in terms offorward vertical integration. 
3.2 Buyers’ bargaining power
Air transport passenger services consumers can be segmented into business motivated
travellers and passengers travelling for other purposes. Business travellers may be classified as
those connected to corporations, to medium and small firms or self-employed. Passengers
travelling for other purposes can be classified as leisure passengers and as people visiting
friends and relative passengers (VFRs).
It is widely accepted in the industry that business travellers connected to large corporations
are less sensitive to price than other passengers because travel costs are not relevant to their
firms in comparison to other corporate costs. In parallel, these users do not bear their travel
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costs, which are supported by their corporations. This characteristic of corporate business
traveller’s behaviour was detected in the early 1980s when frequent flyers programs were
launched. These programs have rewarded the users and in compensation have charged higher
prices to the corporations who pay the services. At the other end of the customers profile are
the leisure and VFRs passengers for whom prices of air travels are relevant to their private
budgets and, as a consequence, are sensitive to air fares levels. The difference of behaviour of
the segments leisure and VFRs travellers are not related to their sensitiveness to price but to
other aspects of their travels, such as destination, period of the year, time of stay at
destination, etc. In the intermediate point of these range of customers are the travellers
connected to medium or small firms or self-employed. For them, air fares relevance varies
according to the economic benefit expected from each specific travel, which may vary in each
trip. The experience and the practice of the airline industry in the last thirty years dispense
more comments on these empirical evidences.
Although the proportion of these four segments in total demand may vary, some general rules
may be formulated based on the author’s experience, as follows. 
• First, experience has shown that as the industry evolves to more mature stages
passengers travelling not for business purposes tend to increase their predominance,
achieving proportionsabove85% (see Office for National Statistics’ Statistical Bulletin
-Overseas Travel and Tourism, December 2009). 
• Second, the growing proportion of VFR travel probably reflects social changes toward
the improvement of population wealth and better income distribution. 
• Third, generally speaking, passengers seem to tend to have different purchase
behaviour with relation to price and schedule sensitiveness, and purchase decision
anticipation as demonstrated in the table below.
Segment
(travel purpose) Price sensitiveness
Schedule
sensitiveness
Purchase decision
anticipation
Leisure High Low Big
Business – corporate
travellers Low High Small
Business – medium
and small firms and
self-employed
Moderate Moderate Small
VFR High Moderate Big
Table 1. Passengers Purchase Behaviour by Segment
Not only final consumers may be considered as airlines’ clients. Intermediates also can be
classified as clients. Intermediates can be segmented into travel agents and tour operators.
Travel agents’ bargaining power depends on the kind of air services being purchased.
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Currently, the purchase process in short haul travel is very simple and specialized travel
advisers do not add much value to clients. That is why in many countries commissions have
not been paid to travel agents by the airlines for several years. In most cases commissions are
charged to clients as a service fee.
In long haul travel the role played by travel agents is still relevant because of the complexity of
these trips, their bargaining power being significant as a consequence. However, the growing
importance of direct sales verified in many industries afforded by information technology
progress is also verified in the airline business, tending to reduce the relevance of travel
agents in the trading process.
On the other hand, tour operators still maintain their importance in leisure travel.
Nevertheless, in many countries inclusive tour trips are a declining segment.
3.3 Substitute products
Up to recent years air transport had been more frequently a substitute to other transport
means than the opposite. The decline of the bus transportation industry in the United States
was clearly related to the arrival of the low cost carriers in that country. However, the inception
of modern train services in Western Europe has played the opposite role. Nevertheless, it
seems that this experience cannot be generalized to other parts of the world because travel
distances are sometimes much bigger or capital availability for those investments is restricted.
3.4 New entrants threat
New entrants’ threat is closely related to how high the barriers to entry are. Among these
barriers, airport slots are the most relevant in the industry but capital requirements and
operating complexity also play an important role.
Slots are time windows existing in airports in which landing and take-off operations are made.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) classifies the airports according to the
capacity of the infra-structure of one specific airport vis-à-vis the corresponding demand.
Thus, according to IATA, there are three levels of airports.
Briefly, a Level 1 airport is one where the capacity of the airport infrastructure is generally
adequate to meet the demands of the airport users at all times. Succinctly, a Level 2 airport is
one where there is potential for congestion during some periods of the day, week or season
and the congestion conflicts may be solved by the cooperation among the airlines. These
airports are named facilitated airports because they require the appointment of a “facilitator”
with specific roles.  Also in an abridged manner, “a Level 3 airport is where demand for airport
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infrastructure significantly exceeds the airport’s capacity during a relevant period and the
expansion of airport infrastructure to meet demand is not possible in the short term” (IATA,
Worldwide Slot Guidelines, 5th edition, 2013). Because it is very difficult to solve the conflicts
raised by the limited infrastructure these airports are called coordinated and they require the
appointment of a “coordinator” with formal delegation and with proper skill and experience in
this function.  In practice, obtaining slots in Level 3 airports is very difficult and depends on
some other airlines’ waiver.
Twice a year conferences between airports, airlines and slot coordinators (which are, in
general, not for profit organizations) take place. In these conferences airlines’ requests for the
next seasons, Winter and Summer, are discussed. The retention and concession of new slots
depend on clear rules related to the historical operating records of the airlines, although
prestige, regularity and punctuality may influence decisions.
The huge air congestion in coordinated areas implies delays and lack of regularity is not
tolerated and transgressions are punished by the imposition of severe fines or even the
cancellation of specific operations.
In few words, slots are assets particularly essential and scarce at coordinated airports, being
important potential constraints to airlines’ expansion.
The existence of legal nationality property restrictions, government good will, capital
requirements and operating complexity are also high entry barriers in the airline industry,
especially in long haul operation. On the other hand, there are no important exit barriers in the
industry because the main assets (aircraft) are very easily transferable, as pointed in IATA’s
publication Vision 2050 (2011). Actually, today aircrafts and aircraft engines and parts are a
commodity and may be procured and negotiated by the Internet. In this manner, AIU–Airline
Update.com (www.airlineupdate.com), a company specialized in providing commercial aviation
directories since 2006, lists 64 different companies offering aircraft and engine finance & sales,
with sizes that vary from very small companies to GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS),“a
global player in commercial aircraft leasing and financing, with over 1,670 owned and
managed aircraft and over 230 customers in over 75 countries” (see www.gecas.com).
3.5 Competitors’ rivalry
Rivalry among competitors in the airline industry has been frequently considered a paradox
mostly because it is an intrinsically concentrated industry and, as a consequence, low rivalry
intensity should be expected. The main reasons are high barriers to entry, the capital required
and very specific know-how. However, there are stronger reasons influencing competition
dynamics in the opposite direction, behind this apparent paradox. First, air transport demand
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elasticity with relation to Gross Domestic Product is high, as it has been consistently
demonstrated by periodical market analysis conducted by IATA (Airline Industry Forecast 2013-
2017; IATA Outlook, published monthly, available in www.iata.org) and Boeing (Current Market
Outlook, available in www.boeing.com), just to quote some important sources. According to
the same publications the world average multiplier of the air transport demand on the GDP is
on average around 1.5. This implies that air transport industry demand is, on average,
significantly more sensitive to economic fluctuations than other industries. Second, the share
of VFR traffic plus holiday travellers has increased consistently during the last years mainly in
developed countries, turning demand each time more sensitive to pricing. Third, operating
costs are unstable because they are highly impacted by fuel. Fourth, marginal costs are
considerably small when compared to total operating costs, stimulating intense price wars.
Fifth, seats supply cannot be stored forcing carriers to bring prices closer to marginal costs.
Experience has shown that forces tending to intensify rivalry among airlines have been largely
predominant over those pressures pushing to a more peaceful companionship unlike other
sectors. The traditional small profitability in the airline industry is much related with the
aspects discussed above.
3.6 The Sixth Force: Alliances and Government
The airline industry offers a very good opportunity for the application of Nalebuff and
Brandenburguer’s (1997) Value Net model. Actually, the role played by government in this
industry and airline alliances fits perfectly the concept of “complementors” formulated by these
authors. This subject is now explored in deeper detail.
Although the degree of governments’ interference has declined considerably following
deregulation, it continues to play an important role in some countries. Apart from the generic
legislation applicable to most industries, governments impose specific constraints on the airline
industry as a result of rules determined by international bilateral or multilateral air services
agreements (ASAs), such as ownership control, freedoms of air and other constrained rules. In
this specific case, governments are supposed to act as their national airlines’ interest
defenders, especially during the negotiations involving ASAs.
However, airlines are subject to a wide range of rules in the operating field, involving safety
and security among others. Needless to say that the extension of governmental intervention
varies from country to country, with the most developed country is experiencing less
governmental influence.
Given that competition is intense in the airline industry, cooperative strategies, or alliances,
play an important role as well. In fact, long haul airlines are especially dependent on alliances
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developed with other airlines. This happens because a relevant proportion of passengers have
origins at upstream points to specific embarking airports or has final destinations in
downstream points to specific disembarking airports.
Alliances emerged in 1978 when the American market became deregulated. However, greater
advances took place in the 1990s, when deregulation in Western Europe happened. In brief,
alliances development, in general, and among airlines, in particular, corresponds to an effort by
a group of firms to increase their competitiveness against other firms out of the group and to
reduce the competition among the firms that belong to the same group.
Doganis (2000) pointed out that alliances among airlines may be of several types, as
demonstrated in the table below:
Table 2. Agreements and Corresponding Alliance Types (Source: Doganis, Rigas, The Airline Business in
the 21st Century, Routledge, 2000)
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4. General environment
General environment may be understood as being the external environment influencing
indirectly a specific firm involving general aspects affecting more than one specific industry. It
encompasses economic, demographic, political, legal, social, cultural, technological and natural
aspects (Kotler & Keller, 2008).
As mentioned previously, GDP is one of the most important drivers of demand in the airline
industry (Intervistas Consulting Inc, 2007; IATA, Airline Industry Forecast 2013-2017, 2013;
IATA, IATA Outlook, 2013; Boeing, 2009; and Boeing, Current Market Outlook, 2013), a
feature that has been repeatedly confirmed by econometric studies. For instance, Moreira
(2013) developed an econometric model in which the dependent variable was the passengers-
kilometres yearly transported in the Brazilian domestic market and the independent variables
were the Brazilian GDP and the corresponding yields. This studied considered historical data
from 1970 to 2013 and found the following regression equation:
• Ln(Y) = 1.7558xLn(X1) – 0.4815xLn(X2) + 0.2336xLn(X3) + 0.1144xLn(X4) – 9.7061,
where:
• Y – Passengers-kilometres early transported in the Brazilian domestic market,
• X1 – Brazilian GDP in 2011 prices,
• X2 – Yield per passenger-kilometre in 2011 prices,
• X3 – A dummy variable reflecting the inception of GOL, a low cost carrier in
Brazil,
• X4 – A dummy variable introduced to improve the adjustment of the statistic
model in 2013 (for forecasting purpose).
The statistical parameters found were R2 = 0.9899 and F = 958.46. All independent variables
were significant at 95% level.
As it may be observed the findings of Moreira (2013) –elasticities of demand to the GDP and to
Yield equal to 1.7558 and – 0.4815, respectively- are especially consistent with the conclusions
of the mentioned studies made for other parts of the world. Obviously, the relation between
the air passengers demand growth rate and GDP growth rate varies from region to region, but
always has been above 1. On the other hand, high statistical significance has been a common
finding in most studies on the subject, confirming the statement that GDP impacts sharply on
demand behaviour.
The figure below shows the estimated ratio of air transport demand growth and Gross
Domestic Product growth for several regions around the world.
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Table 3. Air Transport Demand and Economic Growth Expectations by World Regions (Source: Boeing
Current Market Outlook 2009 to 2028)
Similarly, a population’s geographic distribution affects intensely air transport demand,
basically because other transportation means tend to be more competitive to air transport for
short trips, below 400 kilometres, involving flights of around 50 minutes. For instance, large
countries with a very spread population, as the United States tend to present a domestic air
transport demand proportionally bigger than other similarly wealthy countries. An opposite
example is given by Argentina, where around 40% of the country’s population is concentrated
in the Greater Buenos Aires area. As a consequence, domestic air transport demand in that
country is proportionally smaller than one could expect considering its GDP.
A country’s geographic location and its economic base influence significantly air transport
demand, as is the case of Chile, a relatively developed country, with a small population, but
having a large northbound demand for freight. The explanation for that is the intense
exportation activity related to the fishing industry present in Chile.
Political aspects also influence the airline industry. Once again, Chile is a good example of this
general environment’s facet. Implementing radical neoliberal economic policies between 1973
and 1982, and less radical neoliberal economic policies between 1985 and 1989, the Chilean
government implemented a very open air transport services agreement (ASA) with the United
States, refusing to protect small Chilean carriers against the threat represented by the
competition of foreign airlines. Besides, this lasting macroeconomic approach adopted by the
Chilean Government shaped a generally positive attitude among local entrepreneurs toward
the market economy, something that may be considered a Chilean people’s cultural peculiarity.
Needless to say legislation also reflects cultural aspects of a specific society. Once again, Chile
offers a good example for that because the country’s legal apparatus is one of the most liberal
concerning all economic activities, including air transport services. 
However, legislation also reflects specific economic interests prevailing in specific social
contexts. Brazil offers a good example in this field. Because its internal market is big, Brazilian
authorities, including the aeronautical ones, have largely protected local companies from the
threat of international competition. Obviously, this attitude has pros and cons and cannot be
condemned per se.
Social aspects, such as social and economic disparity among the population, may impact
-60-
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 4(1), 48-77
negatively air transport demand, reducing significantly the share of non-business motivated air
travel. A consequence of this social feature is the small price elasticity verified in these social
contexts. Another consequence of social disparity is the small penetration of Internet in
society’s lower tiers, limiting airlines’ distribution means.
An example of how Internet penetration impacts an airline’s distribution strategy is offered by
Jet Blue which had to review one of its most solid axioms represented by the exclusive use of
Internet for selling the airline’s services. Actually, because Internet penetration is very small in
the Dominican Republic, Jet Blue implemented in this country a traditional distribution system,
supported by a partnership with Western Union, in which bookings are paid directly to the
latter.
Purely cultural aspects also influence the airline industry such as the case of the resistance of
American consumers to turbo props, in opposition to the European public, which has no
important reservations as to flying in this kind of aircraft.
Technological constraints have a huge impact in airlines’ strategy. For instance, in spite of
Brazil having high performing airlines, as the ones studied in this thesis, the air space control
in the country is still very poor, imposing severe limitations to infrastructure efficiency and
reducing, as a consequence, the possibilities of fleet utilization.
Differently from Western Europe countries, preservation of the natural environment is not a
key issue in many other countries, even the United States. As a consequence, airport
expansion is much more related to economic aspects than environment protecting legislation.
For instance, in the United States there is no curfew time and an airport’s working time is
determined by consumer behaviour not by legislation.
5. Generic Expansion strategies types
Expansion strategies may be classified according to the scope of the business involved, as
follows: concentrated growth, vertical integration, horizontal integration or diversification.
Expansion strategies may also be classified according to their process of implementation,
which may be internal growth, mergers and acquisitions, or alliances. By combining the
description of the existing airline business models made in the previous section and the
expansion strategies types briefly reviewed below it is possible to create some guidelines for
coherent expansion strategy types.
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5.1 Concentrated growth
According to this expansion strategy, the firm decides to grow by concentrating its efforts on a
single class of product, in a well-defined market and, if possible, using the same technology.
The growth is obtained by increasing the number of users, the product utilisation or the
frequency of use of this specific product. Four conditions favour the concentrated growth: the
industry is not prone to relevant technological progress (e.g., industries in the later stages of
maturity), target markets are not saturated, the market is sufficiently differentiated to inhibit
new entrants, and basic supplies are available in quantity and at convenient prices (Kluyver &
Pearce II, 2007). The concentrated growth corresponds to the strategy of firms with a single or
dominant business.
Although the airline business does not fulfil totally the conditions enunciated by Kluyver and
Pearce II (2007), concentrated growth has been the preferable expansion strategy adopted by
its players. Probably, one reason is that the airlines’ core competencies are so specific that
they cannot be applied in other industries, due to the singularities of the business. For this
reason, concentrated growth is a strategy that may make sense for all airline business models
and has been the most widely used expansion strategy in the air transport industry.
However, concentrated growth just makes sense for an airline whose corresponding industry’s
five forces do not result in a very hostile environment, which seldom is the case. In general,
rivalry among competitors is so intense that the other forces’ influence prevailing in this
particular context tends to be irrelevant. The reasons for such intense rivalry among
competitors were commented in chapter I. The familiarity with government (the sixth force)
reinforces the propensity for an airline to adopt concentrated growth as its expansion strategy.
Constraints in the general environment may influence an airline to withdraw from concentrated
growth, the most natural expansion strategy. This is the case of Lan Chile which has developed
a horizontal integration strategy by creating several subsidiaries in Latin America, aiming to
overcome the narrowness of the Chilean market.
5.2 Vertical integration
Vertical integration is defined as the number of stages in an industry’s supply chain that a firm
brings within its boundaries (Barney & Hesterly, 2006). Vertical integration may be of two
types: related and non-related vertical integration. A progressive vertical integration happens
when a firm moves to supply chain stages closer to the final consumer. Regressive vertical
integration corresponds to movement in the opposite direction.
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Vertical integration aims to create value for the firm in at least the following ways:
• First, vertical integration may eliminate opportunistic threats from suppliers or buyers
motivated by prospective gains in the short term. By obtaining high control on the
supply chain, the firm improves its operating and financial stability. 
• Second, vertical integration may give opportunity to the firm to exploit its core
competencies, defined as the valuable, rare, costly-to-imitate and relevant to the
business resources and capabilities (Hitt, Ireland & Hoskinson, 2007). 
• Third, by better coordinating operations, vertical integration may be used to reduce
intermediate stocks and reduce operating costs.
But, vertical integration has its inherent limitations: it just works under conditions of low
uncertainty, once significant inflexibilities on the production processes are introduced. Besides,
the risks associated with vertical integration may be extremely high because demand
reductions at the end of the supply chain will impact the firm as a whole, with high potential
losses.
A key disadvantage of vertical integration is that firms adopting this growth strategy are very
exposed to risks associated with demand reductions at the end of the supply chain, as pointed
out by Barney and Hesterly (2006).
Transportation of passengers and cargo by air is a very uncertain business. Some of the most
important reasons are the high proportion of fixed costs, the high impact of oil on total costs,
and, in general, the high demand elasticity with relation to the level of economic activity.
Because air transport of passengers and cargo is a very uncertain business, strict vertical
integration is an expansion strategy very seldom used in the industry. However, some isolated
examples of vertical integration are present in the airline industry. This is the case of
charter/inclusive tour airlines whose parent companies are tour operators. 
Apart from that, there are some airlines that have a tour operator as a branch of the main
business, TAM being an example. In these cases the evident intention is clearly to reduce the
bargaining power of tour operators and this can create a marketing channel conflict.
Nevertheless, it is possible to state that, generically, vertical integration may be a feasible
strategy mainly for charter/inclusive tour airlines. On the other hand, charter/inclusive tour
airlines, being specialized in a specific market segment require a huge and affluent market as
an a priori condition for their existence.
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5.3 Horizontal integration
This strategy corresponds to the expansion of the product lines offered by a firm in the same
business. Internal development or acquisitions are both ways to implement horizontal
integration processes.
The advantage of this kind of expansion process is that the firm enlarges the target market
facing a minimum risk because the core competencies are assumed as being the expansion
backbone. On the other hand, the risks of focusing firms’ efforts in a single industry still
remain, even though to a smaller degree, when compared with concentrated growth.
The risks inherent in horizontal integration are smaller than in concentrated growth and
potential synergies are also smaller. Notwithstanding this, airlines have commonly
implemented a horizontal integration strategy by acquisition aiming, basically, to avoid barriers
to entry.
Examples of horizontal integration in the airline business are offered by LAN Chile, in creating
subsidiaries in Argentina, Equator and Peru, and TACA in creating a subsidiary in Costa Rica.
Basically, these airlines adopted a horizontal integration strategy to expand the target market,
making sustainable growth feasible. Apart from that, horizontal integration seems to be an
adequate strategy for all airline business models.
5.4 Diversification
In this expansion strategy, a firm decides to operate in a new industry. A diversification may be
of two kinds: related diversification and non-related diversification. In the first case, the firm
seeks for opportunities in industries with some degree of relationship with the one of the
mother firm. These relationships involve, in general, aspects related to technology or
distribution. The basic purpose of this kind of diversification is to use a firm’s core
competencies in order to minimize the risks of the new venture. In the second case, a firm’s
objective is to reduce the risks of concentrating its investments in a few sectors, which may be
affected simultaneously by the same kind of external threat (e.g., basic supply scarcity). On
the other hand, by choosing the latter strategy, the firm abandons the prospective of using its
operating core competencies.
Hitt et al. (2007) classify diversification strategies relatedness in two groups:  operational
relatedness, which involves sharing activities between businesses, and corporate relatedness:
implying skill transferences into businesses through the corporate headquarters. Related
constrained diversification concerns the intensity of operational relatedness and related linked
diversification concerns corporate relatedness. 
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Each diversification strategy type corresponds to different entrepreneurial purposes. Related
constrained diversification aims to maximize market power, understood as being the bargaining
power pursued by the firm on buyers or suppliers. Unrelated diversification seeks to obtain
financial economies and risks minimization. Related linked diversification is addressed to
maximizing the economies of scope. Finally, by developing both operational and corporate
relatedness the firm achieves a rare capability, but incurring with it the risk to create scale
diseconomies.
Diversification strategies are uncommon in the airline business, probably because the high
investments required and the gains of scale inhibit companies to diversify toward other
industries.  However, the British Virgin Group is a relevant exception to this general rule. The
Virgin Group is an example of related linked diversification because it operates successfully in
several different businesses, such as media and communications, travel and tourism, leisure,
retail, financial services, healthcare and social and environment.
There are no clear reasons to correlate the applicability of the diversification strategy with the
airline business model chosen by a specific airline. On the contrary, SAS, United Airlines and
Easy Jet indicate poor experience.
Having said that, it is reasonable to assume that diversification is not the preferable strategy
for airlines in general, except in the case in which market size is a real constraint and the
airline is not a promising business.
5.5 Internal growth
Internal growth is performed by sales growth, production capacity and the labour force. The
advantage of internal growth is the better preservation of organisational culture, efficiency,
quality and image. Nevertheless, there are inherent important disadvantages, including
bureaucratic costs and lack of coordination (Wright, Kroll & Parnell, 1998). To this list one may
include capital requirement, timing and higher risks, as compared to acquisitions. This
expansion strategy is clearly the least risky one and has been indicated for businesses that are
intrinsically very risky, such as the airline business. Because of that some successful airlines
clearly and explicitly prefer internal growth. Among them American Airlines and South west are
included.
A potential negative aspect of internal growth is timing because these processes tend to be
slower than mergers and acquisitions and, this being so, emergent opportunities may be lost.
Considering this aspect, internal growth may not be the first option for smaller airlines in which
agility and quick movements are a potential advantage for large airlines.
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It seems that internal growth is an expansion strategy applicable to all airline business models,
depending neither on specific competition conditions existing in the industry nor on the general
environment peculiarities.
5.6 Mergers and acquisitions
A merger occurs when two firms agree to integrate their operations on a relatively co-equal
basis. An acquisition happens when one firm buys a controlling or 100% interest in another
firm with the intent of making the acquired firm a subsidiary business within its portfolio (Hitt
et al., 2007). A co-equal basis is rarely found in this type of firms association, and processes,
indications and reasons are basically the same; however mergers and acquisitions often are
treated under a common label, usually referred as to “M&A”.
The same authors point out the following reasons for mergers and acquisitions: to increase
market power, to overcome entry barriers, to increase speed to market, to increase
diversification, to reshape the firm’s competitive scope, to learn and develop new capabilities,
and to correspond to lower costs and risks compared to new products development.
If there are advantages in mergers and acquisitions, there are problems associated to these
processes. Again quoting Hitt et al. (2007), the main problems encountered are: integration
difficulties, inadequate target evaluation, extraordinary debt, inability to achieve synergy, too
much diversification, managers overly focused on acquisitions, and the resulting firm is too
large. Mergers and acquisitions are a risky strategy because it combines both internal and
external difficulties. Nevertheless it is a common strategy to overcome entry barriers or to
obtain synergies.
Most airlines choose acquisition processes to obtain slots, airport infrastructure and traffic
rights, so surpassing entry barriers. Besides, the identified difficulties are also found very
frequently.
This is the case of Lufthansa in its expansion process by purchasing totally or partially several
airlines, such as Swiss, Austrian Airlines, Brussels Airlines, BMI and Jet Blue. Besides, the
Lufthansa Group made important acquisitions of firms related to airline industry support.
Taking into account the risks inherent with mergers and acquisitions, in general terms this
strategy may be most frequently recommended for airlines that need to overcome high entry
barriers or for smaller airlines that are threatened by a larger new entrant.
The attractiveness of a merger or acquisition strategy for an airline is highly related with some
features of the general environment. In countries where the legal environment allow slots to
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be an airline’s quasi property, mergers and acquisitions may be used to overcome barriers to
entry at congested airports.
On the other hand, in many countries labour legislation imposes heavy commitments on the
acquiring firm in terms of assuming payroll related obligations or other liabilities related to the
labour force. In these countries unions’ activities tend to be intense, making a merger or
acquisition a risky strategy.
These considerations may be extended to other legal aspects specific to the country where the
merger or acquisition is taking place, such as the degree of transferability of liabilities from the
previous firm to the new controlling firm, the anti-trust regulation, and so on.
5.7 Strategic Alliances
Strategic alliances are a firm’s innovative response to radical changes that have occurred in the
competitive environment in the XXI Century. Actually, this new environment is characterized by
scarce resources, competition increasing, more clients’ expectations, pressures from strong
intermediates, unavoidable markets and competition internationalization, deeper and faster
changes in markets and technologies, and unpredictable and turbulent markets (Hooley,
Saunders, Piercy & Nicoulaud, 2008).
Strategic alliances are cooperative strategies, which may be of three kinds: joint ventures,
equity strategic alliances and non-equity strategic alliances. A joint venture happens when two
or more firms create an independent company by combining parts of their assets. An equity
strategic alliance corresponds to partners who own different percentages of equity in a new
venture. A non-equity strategic alliance involves contractual agreements given to a company to
supply, produce, or distribute a firm’s goods or services without equity sharing (Hitt et al.,
2007).
Strategic alliances may play the role of facilitating expansion processes, especially in
businesses where the competition has developed on a worldwide basis. But, other benefits
often are brought by strategic alliances. First, they can improve the performance of current
operations, by exploiting economies of scale, learning from competitors, and managing risks
and sharing costs. Second, strategic alliances may create a favourable competitive
environment by facilitating the development of technologies and tacit collusion. Third, entry
and exit of businesses may become facilitated, by reducing entry and exit costs to new
industries or markets, and by better managing the uncertainty (Barney & Hesterly, 2006).
However, strategic alliances also have their potential pitfalls. They are mostly related to the
opportunistic behaviour of the partner firm, or to the intentional or intentional partner’s failure
to accomplish its commitments.
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Airlines pioneered strategic alliances long before they became popular in recent years, being
evident since the 1930s. However, they gained strength in the 1990s, when the Star Alliance
was created, in 1997, soon after followed by Sky Team and One World.
Currently it is very difficult for an airline operating long haul services not to belong to one of
the three worldwide alliances mentioned above. The reason is that most of the long haul
aircraft are wide-bodies, needing a huge demand to fill their seats. Besides, a very important
proportion of passengers travel beyond national gates, needing local connections to achieve
their final destination. In other words, long haul airlines need local partners in foreign
countries.
On the other hand, frequent flyer programs have become essential marketing tools since the
1970s and the wider an airline’s network is, the more attractive its loyalty plan is. That is why
the core elements of airline partnerships are the integration of frequent flyers programs and
code shared flights, the worldwide strategic alliance being the element that catalyzes the
partnership. 
Probably, long haul aircraft have to be larger because long trip passengers are less sensitive to
schedule than short haul ones. This being so, airlines may concentrate a larger number of
passengers on a single flight without losing significant attractiveness for the service. And, by
doing that, unit costs of transportation are reduced allowing prices to be reduced as well.
So, the cycle of lower travellers’ sensitiveness to schedule on long haul trips; larger long haul
aircraft; need of local partnership; more attractive loyalty programs; and lower traveller’s
sensitiveness to schedule; is completed.
There is a clear correlation between the convenience for an airline to adopt a strategy based
on alliances and its business model. For instance, low cost carriers tend to be stand-alone
carriers, not having, in general, a frequent flyer program. This may be an important obstacle
for a low cost airline to participate in a strategic alliance because most times shared frequent
flyer programs a crucial aspect in the partnership.  On the other hand, long haul legacy
carriers depend much on local partnerships to distribute their passengers.
Legal environment plays an important role on the alliances construction, especially in countries
where anti-trust regulations are very strict and demographic distribution plays an important
role in airline strategic alliances. For instance, in countries where the population is very
concentrated in the main city, such as is the case with Argentina, the importance of a local
partner for a long haul legacy carrier to distribute its traffic is small. The opposite happens in
Western European countries.
The participation in an alliance is an important tool to leverage a growth strategy due to the
quickness and the relatively small amount of resources involved. Besides, entering into a
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global alliance may eliminate the intrinsic competitive disadvantage of smaller airlines allowing
them to obtain significant economies of scope.
However, local airlines with significant market power may give up from participating in a global
alliance in their processes of expansion. The reason is that when an airline gets into an alliance
it is almost mandatory for it to refrain from participating in bilateral alliances with carriers not
participating in the same alliance.
6. The model combining airline business models, industry environment, general
environment and generic expansion strategies
Putting together the groups of elements discussed above it is possible to create an analytical
model to indicate the expansion strategies most compatible with each specific combination of
elements.
As mentioned above, there are eight airline business models (Broad Network, Global, Short
Haul / Medium Haul Independents, Long Haul Independents, All Premium / Business, Regional,
Charter / Inclusive Tour and Low fare). On the other hand, there are six aspects of the industry
environment to be considered (suppliers’ bargaining power, buyer’s bargaining power,
substitute products threat, new entrants threat, competitors’ rivalry and the sixth force:
alliances and government). Finally, there are eight elements related to the general
environment (economy, demography, politics, legal, social, culture, technology and natural
environment).  The model is shown in the figure below.
In order to create a score to help the growth strategy selection, each dimension of the industry
environment is divided into two possibilities (“high “and “moderate or low”). Similarly, each
dimension of the general environment is split into two possibilities (“favourable” and
“unfavourable”).
So, these three groups of elements are combined individually with possible growth strategies,
which are classified by scope and growth process. Each combination is classified according to a
generic value, receiving the designation “Y”, if the combination makes sense; “N” if the
combination doesn’t make sense; or “I” if it is indifferent. Combinations between airline
business models and growth strategies types (related to both scope of business involved and
process of implementation) that made no sense (therefore receiving the designation “N”) were
eliminated. For instance, low fare carriers don’t make alliances with other carriers or put in
practice growth strategies involving diversification and, this being so, there is no reason to
take these combinations into account. The table below summarises this discussion. 
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Figure 2. Airline Expansion Strategies Model
Table 4. Airline Business Models versus Growth Strategies Types
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For the other combinations if the specific combination is assessed as Y, it receives a mark of 1;
if it is assessed as “N”, it receives a mark of -1; and if it is indifferent, it receives a mark of 0.
By adding marks for each combination a score may be created, indicating how adequate this
specific growth strategy is to the airline business model, industry environment and general
environment.
Table 5. Industry’s Six Forces versus Growth Strategies Types
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that the elements of the general environment
and the elements of the industry environment have not a uniform impact on the selection of a
growth strategy. In order to deal with this aspect, the model admits the introduction of weights
that may give more relevance to one or more aspects of the general environment and the
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industry environment. For instance, probably the element “Economy” and the element
“Competitors’ Rivalry” are more relevant than the other elements and as a consequence they
should receive a higher weight.
Table 6. General Environment Aspects versus Growth Strategies Types
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Table 7. Best ranked scored combinations
The total number of combinations generated was 904,736. This value is the result of the
multiplication of 8 (number of airline business models considered), by 4 (number of growth
strategies types according to the scope of business involved), by 3 (number of growth
strategies types according to the process of implementation), by 2 powered to 6 (6 industry
forces each one corresponding each to 2 possibilities – high versus moderate and low), by 2
powered to 8 (8 general environment aspects each one corresponding to two possibilities –
favourable versus unfavourable), which results 1.572.864,minus 668,128, which is the number
of combinations of airline business models with growth strategies types that do not make
sense.
The following tables were built using the weight 2 for the elements “Competitor’s Rivalry”
(Industry Environment) and “Economy” (General Environment),supposing that both have the
highest impact on the growth strategy chosen. Under these suppositions the forty best and the
forty worst ranked scored combinations were selected as tables 7 and 8 show.
An application of the model can be demonstrated as follows. For instance, consider a global
airline operating in an industry environment in which there is a high competitor’s rivalry as well
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as moderate or low both suppliers’ and buyers’ bargaining power, and substitute products and
new entrants’ threats are also small. Besides, the Alliance and Government aspects are
supposed as being important. Also consider that the corresponding general environment is
favourable in all of its aspects (Economy, Demography, Politics, Legal, Social, Culture,
Technological and Nature) except Economy, which is very unfavourable. Table 9 shows the
corresponding growth strategies score.
Table 8. Worst ranked scored combinations 
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Table 9. Example of application of the model for a global airline
7. Conclusions
In this paper a conceptual model for the assessment of airline expansion strategies was
developed combining four groups of elements: business model of the airline under
consideration, industry environment, general environment and expansion strategies types, the
later ones classified according to the strategic scope and the implementation process. It was
made a theoretical development on each of these four groups of elements vis-à-vis airline
industry and general environment ingredients was made in order to test the consistency of the
model.
The model outputs are scores that are associated to each of the 904,736 possible
combinations. The higher score, the more consistent the growth strategy is. The scores were
created giving value “1” to each combination that “makes sense” and “0” to each combination
that does not “make sense”. Additionally, each element was weighted to reflect their relative
importance, receiving weight “2” the elements “Competitors’ Rivalry” (industry environment)
and “Economy” (general environment) and receiving “weigh” “1” all other elements.
The highest score found was 29 and the smallest was -21. Curiously, two thirds of the best
ranked strategies involved vertical integration and alliances and all of the worst ranked
strategies involved concentrated growth and internal growth. This is an indication that in most
cases vertical integration and alliances are the growth strategies with a greater probability of
success. Conversely, concentrated growth and internal growth are the strategies with greater
probability of failure. On the other hand, it is visible that there is no correlation between the
airline business type and the score found, as tables 7 and 8 show.
The hypothetical application presented in table 9 shows that the model is easy to manipulate
and it is useful to identify the most consistent generic growth strategies applicable to this
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specific case. Therefore, the model can be used to assess the consistency of growth strategies
put in practice by airlines operating in different contexts.
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